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CASE COMMENTS
Since neither solution is wholly satisfactory the legislature
may have to be charged with the task of providing a remedy by
statute, (A) to extend criminal liability of corporations beyond
corporate dissolution and (B) to allow the assets to be followed into
the hands of stockholders, the real parties in interest, and require
them to respond to the extent of their distributive shares. See
State v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 184 Wis. 301, 199 N.W.
213 (1924).
M. J. P.
DEEDS-VALIDITY OF A DEED NOT SIGNED BY ALL PARTIES DESIG-
NATED As GRANToRs.-In a proceeding brought to partition real
estate, reversed on other grounds, D entered, as evidence that she
was not a proper party to the suit, a deed designating eight grantors
but signed by only D and four others. Dictum, that such deeds
are governed by the rule laid down in Ely v. Phillips; that those
parties signing a contract prepared for signatures of other persons,
to be affixed along with theirs, and intended to be signed by all the
parties named in it, are not bound until all have signed it, and
incur no obligation, if any of those who were to have signed refuse
to do so. Stalnaker v. Stalnaker, 80 S.E.2d 878, 883 (W. Va. 1954).
In Ely v. Phillips, 89 W. Va. 580, 109 S.E. 808 (1921), the court
was not applying real property law to a deed but was considering an
undelivered deed as memorandum of an oral contract in a suit for
specific performance. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
and other courts have held than an undelivered deed that has been
signed is sufficient memorandum of an oral contract to sell real
property to remove the contract from the Statute of Frauds. Moore,
Keppel & Co. v. Ward, 71 W. Va. 393, 76 S.E. 807 (1912); Parrill
v. McKinley, 9 Gratt. 1 (Va. 1852). The court in the Ely case,
applying the contract rule that the parties are not bound pointed
out that such is the general rule but that there is an exception, that
in the absence of evidence showing an intent not to be bound, the
parties are bound by their signing the contract. That case turned
on the point that the contract was for the sale and removal of timber,
the court refusing specific performance on the ground that all
cotenants would have to agree to removal before the timber could
be removed, holding that this was sufficient to show that those
signing did not intend to be bound until all the cotenants signed.
Obviously, the Ely case is distinguishable as the court there was
applying contract law. The authorities are uniform in holding
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that the validity of a contract for the sale of real property is judged
by the same rules which pertain to contracts generally. 3 AMAERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 11:13, (Casner ed. 1952).
Recognizing this as a contract rule does not resolve the problem
presented in the Stalnaker case. A search of the authorities shows
that the West Virginia court is the only court that has ever indicated
an intention to apply this contract rule to real property deeds, and
that that court held such a deed valid and binding on the parties
signing in Adams v. Medsker, 25 W. Va. 127 (1884). There the deci-
sion was handed down on a much more confused state of facts than is
found in either the Ely or Stalnaker case, since some of the desig-
nated grantors had not signed the deed, some had, and parties had
signed as grantors who were not designated as such in the deed.
The court held it was the deed of those designated grantors who had
signed, but that it was not the deed of those parties who had signed
but were not designated as grantors, nor was it the deed of desig-
nated grantors who had not signed. It is to be noted, that this is
a direct holding on this issue, in a case where it was contested that
'the signors were not bound. Also, this was a real property action.
Tiffany, in his treatise on real property, 4 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 1023 (3d ed. 1939), states the rule that when a convey-
ance purports to be by more than one grantor but all the grantors
do not sign, the signatures of those that do, followed by delivery
by them, will be sufficient to divest their interest, unless their
delivery was conditional upon signature by the others. The West
Virginia court, in effect, followed this rule in Bennett v. Neff, 130
W. Va. 121, 42 S.E.2d 793 (1947), when they held that the grantor,
who had signed, was not bound since those designated as co-grantors,
although they were not necessary parties to the deed, had not
signed and there was evidence that the grantor did not intend a
delivery until they had. The signing by the designated co-grantors
was construed as a condition to be met before delivery would be
effective, as evidenced by the grantor's and grantee's actions.
It is to be noted that in the Bennett case and under the rule
that Tiffany sets out the signing by the co-grantors is treated
as a possible condition to delivery; however, this condition must
be shown by evidence that the grantor did not intend a delivery
until all the designated parties had signed. It is an established
rule of real property that any deed to transfer title to real estate
must be accompanied by a delivery. 26 C.J.S., Deeds § 40 (1950).
Delivery depends upon the intention of the grantor as manifested
by his words and the circumstances surrounding the transaction-
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generally without an intent to pass title there is no delivery, although
there may be a manual handing over the deed, Downs v. Downs, 89
WV. Va. 155, 108 S.E. 155 (1921). Obviously there is not too much
difference between the rule of the Bennett case and the rule of the
Ely case. Both turn on intent. Delivery of the instrument in either
case indicates an intent of the signor to be bound, and under the
contract rule would be sufficient to remove the case from the
general rule and bring it within the exception.
The problem arises as to the effect either rule has on title search.
As pointed out, every deed to transfer title must be accompanied
by delivery; therefore, any deed may be invalidated by the grantor
proving that there was no intent to pass title, i.e., no delivery or a
conditional delivery. The only distinction where the deed is not
signed by all the named grantors is that the possibility of a condi-
tional delivery is apparent on the face of the deed. It is submitted
that this should not be too troublesome; however, it is recommended
that such a situation should be noted in the attorney's title report.
The West Virginia court has held that signing, sealing, acknowledg-
ment or attestation are presumptive evidence of delivery, Downs v.
Downs, supra; that acknowledgment alone is strong evidence to
show delivery, Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 612, 30 S.E. 201 (1898):
and that recordation is prima facie evidence of delivery, Ferguson
v. Bond, 39 AN. Va. 561, 20 S.E. 591 (1894). Therefore, when an,,
deed has been signed, acknowledged, and recorded the burden of
proof is on the grantor to prove a conditional delivery. The same
is true of a deed signed by only a part of the designated grantors.
This is further strengthened by W. VA. CODE c. 36, art. 3, § 4
(Michie 1955) which states that any instrument which shows on
its face a present intent to pass title, if properly executed and de-
livered, shall be given effect according to its manifest intent.
In conclusion, it is submitted that, in light of the above deci-
sions, such deeds, when recorded and acknowledged, can be con-
sidered as valid and binding as are those deeds in which all parties
have signed. The parties who have signed are bound unless the),
can prove an intent not to be bound, thus leaving only the problem
of securing conveyance from the grantors who did not sign.
J. W. P.
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